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EVIDENCE-SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE

WIHOUT WAR'AxT.-[South Dakota] Defendant was legally arrested just outside his room. The
arresting officer returned half an
hour later and searched defendant's
room without a warrant. On the
evidence thus secured defendant
was tried and convicted of the
crime of having burglary tools in
On appeal, rehis possession.
versed. Held: The evidence was
illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. State v. McClendon,
266 N. W. 762 (S. D. 1:936).
While it has always been assumed that "one's house cannot
lawfully be searched without a
search warrant except as incident
to a lawful arrest therein" (Agnello v. United States, 296 U. S. 20
(1935)), was the search in the
present case incident to the arrest?
In Papani v. United States, 84 F.
(2d) 160 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), it
was said that a search is not incidental to the arrest unless made
contemporaneously at the place of
arrest. This seems to be the prevalent federal view with which the
instant case is in accord. Other
federal cases simply assume, without discussing the time element,
that search and seizure of evidence
is not only permissible but also the
duty of an officer when serving an

Case Editor

arrest warrant.

United States v.

Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (S. D. N. Y.
1910); United States v. Wilson, 163
Fed. 338 (S. D. N. Y. 1908);
United States v. Snyder, 278 Fed.
650 (D. C. W. Va. 1922); Rocchia
v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 966 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1935); Bruce v. United
States, 73 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935). The circumstances of
the instant case are almost identical with those of People v. Defore,
242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926),
and Poulos v. United States, 8 F.
(2d) 120 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925). In
the former case the search was
made some time after an illegal arrest. The New York Court of Appeals inferred that if the arrest had
been legal the search also would
have been legal. In the Poulos
case the several .srclies subsequent to the arrest were held unreasonable. The fact that they
might have been incident to the
arrest was not discussed. The constitution prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
fact that the search is not precisely
contemporaneous with the arrest
should not necessarily make it unreasonable. See generally, Fraenkel, Concerring Search and Seizures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361;
Comment (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 612.
The issue in the instant case should
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v. United States, 282 U. S. 344
(1931); Ganci v. United States, 255
U. S. 313 (1921)), or is for goods
lawfully in the possession of the
defendant (Amos v. United States,
255 U. S. 3!= (1921); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the general rule,
expressed in the Weeks case, however, by holding evidence admissible under the following circumstances: (1) where the objects are
in the immediate possession of the
defendant
(Marron v. United
it is merely ignored." 4 WIGMORE, States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927)); (2)
EV-DENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2183. There
where the issue of admissibility is
are two exceptions: matters of ofraised too late (Segurola v. United
ficial record, and self incriminating States, 275 U. S. 107 (1927)); (3)
documents or other evidence the where there is no physical seizure
use of which in criminal cases (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
would violate the Fifth AmendS. 438 (1927)); (4) where the seizment. See WIGMORE, loc cit. supra. use is not from the home or office
The court in the instant case ad- of the defendant (Carroll v. United
heres to the professed federal rule States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925)); (5)
that evidence obtained by illegal where the search and seizure are
search and seizure cannot be used not conducted by federal officers
as evidence on trial. In Weeks v. (Gambino v. United States, 275 U.
S. 310 (1927); Burdeau v. McUnited States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914),
the Supreme Court held that evi- Dowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1920)); and
dence obtained by illegal search (6) where the goods taken are conand seizure is inadmissible. Ac- traband in any sense. (Carroll v.
cord: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States; Fenton v. United
States, 268 Fed. 221 (D. C. Mont.
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
See Note (1931') 22 J. Crim. L. 589. 1920). Judge Hand, in summarPrior to the Weeks case the Court izing the federal rule, makes this
"Private books and
had held that evidence which is distinction:
pertinent to the issue is admissible papers cannot be seized and used
although it may have been pro- as incriminating evidence. The
cured illegally. Adams v. New corpus delicti itself has not, I think,
York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904). But been held incapable of detention
since the later case, evidence has and production to establish the
been held inadmissible where the crime." United States v. Welsh, 247
search is made as an incident to an Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1917). See
illegal arrest (Lefkowitz v. United Comment (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 536,
States, 285 U. S. 452 (1931) noted where the status of the federal rule
(1932) 23 J. Crim. L. 111; Byars v. is discussed. If this distinction is
sound, the burglary tools in the inUnited States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927)),
or is purely exploratory (Go-Bart stant case were the corpus delicti
be the reasonableness of the time
interval between the arrest and the
search.
Once a court has determined that
the evidence has been obtained illegally, it is further confronted
with the issue of the admissibility
of such evidence. The common law
rule, which thirty-three states follow, is that the "admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through
which the party has been enabled
to obtain the evidence. The illegality is by no means condoned;
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of the crime of possession and cated and without friends, were
should, therefore, have been ad- indicted for possessing and uttering counterfeit money. They were
mitted in evidence.
The South Dakota decisions ap- not informed of the fact until
pear to be in a state of confusion brought into court for trial. At
on this point. In the following cases that time they pleaded not guilty
objects which were the corpus and the trial judge asked them if
delicti of the crime and incidentally they had counsel. When they responded in the negative, he did not
also contraband were held admissible: City of Sioux Falls v. Wal- inquire whether they wished counser, 45 S. D. 417, 187 N. W. 821 sel appointed, but proceeded with
the trial, which resulted in a con(illegal liquor seized);
(1922)
State v. Kieffer, 47 S. D. 180, 196 viction. Petitioners did not ask
for a new trial or inform the court
N. W. 967 (1924) (illegal liquor
seized); State v. Newharth, 59 S. that they wished to appeal. After
they had spent several months in
D. 272, 209 N. W. 542 (1926) (containers for illegal liquor seized). prison they filed application for apBut such cases are to be contrasted peal. When these were denied bewith the following in which ille- cause filed too late, petitioners
gally seized evidence was held in- sought writs of habeas corpus, aladmissible: Gamble v. Keyes, 49 leging that their constitutional
S. D. 39, 153 N. W. 888 (1925) (il- right to counsel had been violated.
legal liquor seized); State v. Tan- The petitions were denied. Held:
ner, 53 S. D. :46, 235 N. W. 502 The rights of petitioners under both
(1931); State v. Gooder, 57 S. D. the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
619, 234 N. W. 610 (1931) (illegal of the Constitution were violated,
but this could not be attacked on
liquor seized).
habeas corpus proceedings. BridThese cases permitting contraband illegally seized to be used in well v. Aderhold, Warden, 13 F.
evidence strike a balance between Supp. 253 (N. D. Ga. 1935).
The court agreed that the failthe common law rule and that of
the Weeks case, supra. Since the ure of the trial judge to appoint
defendant has no property rights in counsel deprived petitioners of
the contraband, the constitutional their constitutional rights, but reprovision against illegal searches fused to lend its aid on the ground
and seizures is not violated by its that since the court had jurisdicuse in evidence; and since the tion, mere errors of law could be
goods are not obtained by the use corrected only on appeal or writ
of process against him as a wit- of error. The general rule folness, he is not forced to give in- lowed by the federal courts is that
criminating testimony against him- habeas corpus can be used only to
self. Wigmore, Using Evidence attack the jurisdiction of the court.
Obtained by Illegal Search and Ex Parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 118
(1884); In re Schneider, 148 U. S.
Seizure (1922) 8. A. B. A. J. 479.
162 (1893); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.
Lois GOLBSTEnu.
HABEAs Cc.OPus-DENIA. OF RiGHir
PetiCOU.NSEL.-[Federal]
TO
tioners, who were indigent, unedu-

S. 333 (1923); Knewel v. Egan, 268
U. S. 442 (1925); see Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts
(1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 433, 435.
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This rule is generally followed in
the state courts. People ex rel.
Morris v. Hazard, 356 Il. 448, 191
N. E. 54 (1934); People v. Harris,
266 Mich. 317, 253 N. W. 312 (1934).
(The distinction between those
facts which are mere error and
those which vitiate jurisdiction is
drawn by Williams, FederalHabeas
Corpus (1924) 9 St. Louis L. Rev.
250, 260.)
But the scope of review on habeas corpus in the federal courts
is not always restricted to questions of jurisdiction alone. In
Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219
(1914), the Court stated that no
hard and fast rule had been formulated as to how far it would go
in passing upon questions raised
on habeas corpus proceedings. This
statement, though dicta, clearly indicates that the Supreme Court
recognizes that there may be certain instances in which it will look
beyond the question of jurisdiction.
In United States ex rel. Kennedy v.
Tyler, 269 U. S. 13 (1925), it was
said that the Court has power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to
inquire into the cause of the detention of any person asserting
that he is being held in violation
of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. The
power to make these determinations surely constitutes an enlargement of the basic rule that only
jurisdictional matters may be considered. See note to Capone v.
Aderhold, Warden, 71 F. (2d) 160
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934), in (1935) 3
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 253. In the
Capone case, however, the court
refused the writ where it appeared
the indictment was returned after
the three-year limitations had run.
(For a contrary result, see People
v. McGee. 1 Cal. "(2d) 611, 36 P.

(2d) 378 (1934) noted (1935) 8 S.
Calif. L. Rev. 155.)
In Moore v. Dempscy, 261 U. S.
86 (1923), habeas corpus was
granted, not on the ground that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction, but
that the conviction in the Arkansas
court, dominated by mob violence,
was a denial of due process of law.
(For an interesting discussion of
the details of this case, see Waterman and Overton, The Aftermath
of Moore v. Dempsey (1933) 18 St.
Louis L. Rev. 117, and Federal Habeas Corpus and Moore v. D,2lnpsey (1933) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
397.) Where the conviction is had
in a federal court the Supreme
Court would probably be more
willing to consider non-jurisdictional questions than it would in
state cases. See Ashe v. United
States ex rel. Vals-tta, 270 U. S. 424,
426 (1926); Nutting, The Supreme
Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
and Criminal Cases (1936) 3 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 244; !1crtes (1,33) 23
J. Crim. L. 841, (1935) 25 J. Crim.
L. 943.
It is clear that deprivation of the
right to counsel in the present case
was a violation of constitutional
rights. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.
S. 45 (1932) noted (1933) 23 J.
Crim. L. 841; FERRis, EXTRAORDINARY LEGArL REMEDMS (1926) 124;
Comment (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
245, 252. That being so, the writ
should be granted when the constitutional right is violated. See
Comment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev.
404, 411-12. Though the doctrine
of Moore v. Dempsey, supra, would
limit granting the writ to "exceptional circumstances" (Cf. Gotto v.
L.ane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924); Ex
Parte Lang, 85 U. S. 163 (1873)),
it is believed that the exigencies of
the instant case were such as would
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warrant the use of the writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of
the petitioners.
CHARLES B. ROBISON.
VERDICT PROCURED

BY FRAUD---

BASTARDY PRoCEEDINGS.-[Pennsyl-

vania] Defendant was tried and
convicted on a charge of fornication and bastardy. He obtained a
new trial, at which time the prosecutrix agreed to drop the charges
and a verdict of acquittal was entered after defendant refused to
accept a nolle prosequi. Two years
later it was discovered his attorneys had coerced the prosecutrix
to consent to the verdict. On motion of the Commonwealth, the
trial court set aside the verdict.
On appeal, reversed. Held: Proceedings in fornication and bastardy being criminal in nature, a
verdict of acquittal cannot be set
aside, even though obtained by
fraud. Commonwealth v. Kroekel,
183 Atl. 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936).
There are three distinct views in
the United States as to .the nature
of proceedings in bastardy. Pennsylvania, with Georgia and Maxyland, follows the English holdingthat it is essentially criminal. No
doubt the basis for this rule is, as
indicated in the principal case, the
fact that bastardy proceedings depend on the criminal adultery statute in those states. See for example: PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 18, §711. A few more have
held that while the origin depends
upon criminal statutes the purpose
is not punishment, but the support
of the child, and thus the offense is
deemed quasi-criminal or quasicivil. In this group are Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, New York, South Dakota and
Wisconsin. See 2 WHARTON, CRaV-
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iNAL LAW (12th ed. 1932)

§2103.
The third group, representing a
majority of the states, treats bastardy proceedings as civil in nature. In such jurisdictions the verdict may be reached upon no more
than a preponderance of the evidence, instead of the usual "beyond a reasonable doubt" formula
(Vail v. State, 1 Penn. (Del.) 8,
39 Atl. 451 (1897); People v.
Christmau, 66 IMI. 162 (1872); State
v. Nichols, 29 Minn. 357, 13 N. W.
153 (1882); State v. Haslebacher,
1'25 Ore. 389, 266 Pac. 900 (1928));
the defendant may be forced to
testify against himself (State v.
McKay, 54 N. D. 801, 211 N. W. 435
(1926); State v. Stilivell, 45 S. D.
606, 189 N. W. 697 (1927) (a jurisdiction holding such proceedings to
be quasi-criminal)); a statute imposing additional liability for support is retroactive (State v. Davis.
178 Ark. 692, 11 S. W. (2d) 479
(1928)); a statute allowing a fivesixths verdict in civil cases can be
invoked (State v. Cummins, 56 S.
D. 439, 229 N. W. 302 (1930)); the
prosecution may appeal (Morris v.
State, 115 Ind. 282 (1888)); and it
may also obtain change of venue,
or a new trial (Saint v. State, 68
Ind. 128 (1879)). Since the purpose of bastardy proceedings is
support of the child, the mother
being the real party in interest
(Libby v. State, 42 Olda. 603, 142
Pac. 406 (1914)), and the process
includes many elements of civil
suits, the better view would be to
consider such proceedings civil in
nature.
But recognizing that Pennsylvania has held that proceedings of
this kind are criminal, setting aside
a verdict of acquittal procured by
fraud should not be regarded as
subjecting the defendant to a sec-
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ond trial. This question is raised
by the plea of autrefois acquit,
which is but the application to
criminal law of the broader doctrine of res judicata,that any controversy once adjudicated between
the parties shall not again be questioned. The innocence of the accused is the controverted point,
and in order to make a valid plea
of former acquittal, the defendant
must show a verdict on the merits.
People v. Fishman, 119 N. Y. S. 89
(1909); see 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (1778) 246; Cf. Conwill v.
State, 124 Miss. 716, 86 So. 876
(1921'). If, however, he procures
his own acquittal or conviction, it
will not be a bar to subsequent
prosecutions, whether in the same
or another court. State v. Ketchum,
113 Ark. 68, 167 S. W. 73 (1914)
(discharged); DeBord v. People, 27
Colo. 377, 61 Pac. 599 (1900) (conviction); State v. Reed, 26 Conn.
202 (1857) (acquittal); State v.
Green, 16 Iowa 239 (1864) (acquittal); People v. Cuatt, 126 N. Y.
S. 1114 (f910) (conviction); Halbert v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. Rep. 378,
195 Pac. 504 (1921) (conviction);
Richardson v. State, 109 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 403, 5 S. W. (2d) 141 (1928).
In theory there may be a distinction between the above cases
of collusive prosecution, and the
instant case of bona fide prosecution coupled with a subsequent
fraud by the defendant.
But
viewed as a practical problem of
criminal law administration, the
distinction becomes even more
tenuous. See McDermott v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. 1227, 100 S. W.
830 (1907) (collusive dismissal of
charges not a bar to later prosecution); State v. Swepson, 79 N. C.
674 (1878) (fraudulent acquittal no
bar to new prosecution, and man-
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damus to reopen former prosecution refused); cf. Schneider v.
State, 33 Ohio App. 125, 168 N. E.
568, 569 (1929); but see Shideler
v. State, 129 Ind. 523, 28 N. E. 537
(1891) (bribery of prosecuting attorney did not render verdict of
acquittal void, the state being a
party). Writers on the problem
agree that a verdict of acquittal
obtained by fraud of the accused
should be no bar to a subsequent
prosecution. 1 BIsHOP, CRin=£NAL
LAw (9th ed. 1923) §1009; 1 CnrsTY, CRImrNAL LAW (1819) §657; 2
WHARTON,

CIM,-INAL

PROCEDURE

(10th ed. 19f8) §13S1; Comley,
Former Jeopardy (1926) 35 Yale
L. J. 674, 677. Since the fraudulent
verdict in the instant case was not
a trial on the merits, it should not
bar a subsequent prosecution.
It is interesting to note that defendant's attorneys were disbarred
as a result of the discovery of their
conduct in the Kroekel case. See
In re Salus, 22 Pa. D. & Co. R. 573
(1935), aff'd, 321 Pa. 106, 184 Atl.
70 (1936); In re Goldberg, 22 Pa.
D. & Co. R. 582 (1935), afd, 321
Pa. 109, 1"84 Atl. 74 (1936).
EUGENE

R.

MVELSON.

PRINCIPAL AND AcCESSORY-INDICTMENT-PRINCIPAL AS CORPORA-

TION.-[Illinois] The president of
a corporation was convicted as an
accessory of his corporation in violation of the Motor Fuel Tax Act.
The court fined him $2000 on each
of eighteen counts charging the
collection of taxes and the refusal
to account therefor to the Department of Finance. A sentence
of one to five years in the penitentiary was imposed on four counts
charging the principal with doing
business as a distributor without a
license. On appeal, reversed. Held:
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Defendant could not be sentenced
to prison under the statute requiring accessories before the fact to
be considered as principals since
the corporate principal could not
be imprisoned. People v. Duncan,
2 N. E. (2d) 705 (Ill. 1936).
The sole ground of reversal in
this case was the decision of the
court that an accessory of a corporation violating the criminal law
cannot be imprisoned whenever his
principal could not be imprisoned.
The court apparently read the provision in the Illinois law to be
"shall be considered the same as
his principal" instead of "shall be
considered as principal," as it
reads.
Under the Illinois statute it has
been held that an accessory is punishable as a principal even though
the principal is not convicted and
is not amenable to justice as
where the principal has been found
insane or has been promised immunity. Conley v. People, 170 Ill.
587, 48 N. E. 911 (1897); see People v. Armstrong, 299 Ill. 349, 353,
132 N. E. 547, 549 (1921), People
v. Rees, 268 Ill. 585, 593, 109 N. E.
473, 476 (1915). Thus, the amenability of the principal to punishment should have no effect upon
the amenability of the accessory to
punishment, and the instant case

607

Bever, 243 II. 136, 93 N. E. 725
(1911). Since the defendant in the
instant case was indicted as accessory, the decision could have been
reversed on the ground that he
could not be punished as principal.
The reason for such a rule is not
apparent, since the punishment is
the same in all ordinary cases, and
the defendant is not really harmed
by the form of the indictment.
Both these objectionable limitations would have been avoided had
the defendant been indicted as a
principal. This could easily have
been done, since where the act constituting the offense was done by
the corporation under the direction
or permission of the officer, he is
a principal. United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578 (D. C. Mass.
1912), City of Wyandotte v. Corrigan,35 Kan. 21f, 10 Pac. 99 -(1886),
People v. Cooper, 193 N. Y. S. 16
(1922), State v. Thomas, 123 Wash.
299, 212 Pac. 253 (1923).
Many courts in states having
statutes like that of Illinois providing that accessories before the
fact be considered as principals
hold that the defendant may be indicted as accessory and still receive the punishment of a principal. People v. Rozelle, 78 Cal. 84,
20 Pac. 36 (1888), Geutling v. State,
198 Ind. 718, 153 N. E. 765 (1926),
should not have been reversed up- Commonwealth v. Bain, 240 Ky.
749, 43 S. W. (2d) 8 (1931), State
on the grounds stated.
Under the Illinois statute provid- v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32 (1859), People
ing that accessories be considered v. Smith, 177 N. Y. S. 519 (1919).
as principals, the courts have held Under all such statutes the accesthat to receive the punishment of sory may be prosecuted, tried, and
a principal, the defendant must punished though the real principal
have been indicted as principal, not be neither prosecuted nor tried.
as accessory. Baxter v. People, 8 Lake v. State, 100 Fla. 373, 129 So.
Ill. 368 (1846), Usselton v. People, 827 (1930), Commonwealth v. Long,
]49 Ill. 612, 36 N. E. 952 (1894), 246 Ky. 809, 56 S. W. (2d) 524
Fixmer v. People, 153 Ill. 123, 38 (f"933), People v. Smith, 271 Mich.
N. E. 667 (1894), People v. Van 553, 260 N. W. 911 (1935), People
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v. Beinter, 168 N. Y. S. 945 (1918),
Thomas v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. Rep.
204, 267 Pac. 1040 (1928).
Where, however, the statute says
that the accessory shall be deemed
an accomplice and equally criminal
as the principal offender, and shall
be punished in the same manner,
the defendant must be indicted as
accessory. Schwartz v. State, 185
Atl. 233 (Del. 1936). Under such
a provision the rule of the instant
case, if accepted, could not be
avoided.
Had the defendant in the instant
case been the manager for an individual or a partnership the reason given for reversal would have
been inapplicable. And yet the
criminality of each act would be
identical, and there is no reason for
supposing that the legislature intended any distinction.
PAUL ZEMPEL.

STATUTORY PRESUMPTION-PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF FELONIOUS INTENT IN UNLICENSED POSSESSION OF
WEAPON.--[California]
Defendant
was convicted of second degree
murder. At the time of the crime
he was carrying a pistol without a
license. The court instructed the
jury, without comment, that the
possession of a concealable weapon
without a license "was prima facie
evidence of intent to commit a felony against the person."
CAL.
GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act
1970, §3. The defendant pleaded
self defense and submitted evidence that apparently would have
satisfied the jury of his innocence
but for the statutory presumption.
On appeal, reversed. Held: The
statute violates due process. People v. Murguia, 57 P. (2d) 115 (Cal.
1936).
Seemingly approving the manner

of giving the charge, and directing
its attention to the statute, the
court concluded that there existed
no rational evidentiary relation between "the mere absence of a license to carry a weapon" and "the
intent with which the holder of a
weapon used it," and for this reason declared the statute unconstitutional. Manley v. Georgia, 279
U. S. 1 (1929); State v. Grimmet,
33 Idaho 203, 193 Pac. 380 (1920);
see People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32,
43, 34 N. E. 759, 763 (1893); Mobile
v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 43
(1910). The dissenting opinion approved the applicability of the test
used by the majority, but stated
that the inference was not unreasonable nor "a purely arbitrary
mandate."
There is authority for the proposition that the judiciary may not
inquire into the validity of a prima
facie inference established by statute. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) §1356. This view, however,
presupposes the court's use of the
term prima facie in its ordinary
meaning, i. e., that the presumption
is rebuttable by introduction of
evidence by the defendant. 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra §2487. Where,
however, the statute creates an arbitrary presumption that is given
the effect of evidence and is to
prevail unless the opposing testimony is found by the jury to preponderate, due process of law is
violated when there is no rational
connection between the fact and
the inference. Western & Atlantic
R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639
(1929); Manley v. Georgia, supra;
Morrison v. California,281 U. S. 82
(1934); cf. Casey v. United States,
276 U. S. 394, 425 (1928); see Note
(1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 100. Such
was the effect of the presumption
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in this case, and the test of rational
relation was proper. But one recent decision has gone so far as to
hold that a criminal statute is unconstitutional if the fact upon
which the inference rests would be
of itself insufficient to support a
conviction. Powers v. State, 204
lnd. 472, 184 N. E. 549 (1933) noted
(1934) 10 Ind. L. Rev. 180. This
extreme view, which seems to set
at naught the entire theory of presumptions, is not noticed in the
present opinion.
By its very broadness this statute
may facilitate, or even produce,
convictions of the most unfortunate
nature, for it creates in any gun
carrying, unlicensed defendant a
prina facie intent to commit any
"felony against the person" with
which he is charged by the prosecuting officer. By this undiscriminatory creation of inference persons unable to adduce evidence of
lack of intent might be convicted
of a felony upon mere proof of
simple assault-if charged with assault with intent to commit felony
-or
of felonious attempt upon
mere proof of a threatening act.
Moreover, conviction caused by
passion or prejudice of the jury,
otherwise resting solely upon the
presumption, could not be inquired
into. In the absence of precedents,
the court has as a matter of reason, supported as well by considerations of justice and the background of the statute, made a
proper determination that the statute is unconstitutional for the lack
of reasonable connection between
the fact of carrying a concealed
weapon unlicensed, and the inten',
to commit a felony.
This case is particulhrly interesting in that it is one of the first to
consider the validity of a statute

which, as a part of uniform legislation, has been enacted in eight
states. Rigorous firearm regulation began in the United States in
1887 by the passage of a "license
to purchase" act in New York,
which was made more strhigent in
1911 by the famous "Sullivan Law,"
by which purchase or possession
of a concealable firearm became a
misdemeanor, and the carrying of
such a weapon without a license,
a felony. Laws of New York (1'911)
c. 195, §442. Little or no regulation
of firearms prevailed in other jurisdictions, and the periodical literature after the turn of the century was rich in an outcry for more
effective control of firearms. See
[19091 Miss. B. A. Rep. 10; Garner,
Is the Pistol Responsible for Crime?
(1912) 1 J. Crim. L. 793; (1913)
16 Law Notes 207; (1'917) -84
Cent. L. J. 182; Prohibition of
Manufacture and Sale of Weapons
(1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 1'27. Soon
thereafter laws of many types were
passed to deal with the problem,
but no state enacted as stringent
a law as New York, partly because
of the concerted resistance of those
who wanted easy accessibility of
firearms for legitimate purposes.
Frederic, Pistol Regulation: Its
Principles and History (1932) 23
J. Crim. L. 531. Constitutional restrictions themselves
presented
little or no obstacle to the regulation of firearms. Emery, The Conetitutional Right to Keep and Bear
Arns (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 473.
Following the World War those
who formerly resisted firearm regulation suggested uniform state
legislation drafted under the auspices of the United States Revolver Association. This draft was
enacted in California in 1923 and
also in Indiana, New Jersey, North

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
defective persons, felons, drug addicts and minors, nothing in the Act
prohibits the acquiring of a concealable weapon by any citizen.
Control of evil use is sought by
means of heavy penalties for unlicensed carrying, by wide increase
of punishment for being armed
while committing a felony, and,
through Section 3 by technical
facilitation of conviction for felony, of those who carry pistols
without a license. Because of the
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL COMobvious impossibility of wide pubMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWVS
(1924) 224, 316, 854; (1927) 866, lication, or understanding of this
914; (1930) 124, 530; Imlay, Uni- highly techincal legality among
form Firearms Act Reaffirmed those who carry their weapons but
(1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 799. Beyond neglect to obtain a license, this
the licensing of dealers, of whom statute is but a negligible deterrent
extensive records are required, and to their criminal use.
RicmuD C. SHELDON.
the prohibition of sale to certain

Dakota and Oregon, failing in Illinois, but adopted in the District of
Columbia only after Section 3 (the
one in controversy in the present
case) was stricken out. The Uniform Firearms Act, approved in
1926, withdrawn, reconsidered and
approved again in 1930 (now
adopted in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South Dakota), was modelled upon this draft and contains
substantially all its provisions.

